

**Is there an alternative to New World Disorder?**

The state of international relations is perhaps as confused and as confusing as it has been for many decades. A number of the principal players are moving either up or down the ladder of power relationships at an unprecedented rate. The challenges to international institutions are as great as they have ever been and their performance often falls well short of what is required. So this is a good moment to ask a fairly fundamental question about the direction in which we are going as I have done in the title of this talk, and - somewhat more difficult - to try to provide an answer to it.

Neither governments, nor commentators, nor academics - with only a few partial exceptions - predicted the sudden end of the Cold War in 1989-90, the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union and the almost coincidental collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Those events, marking the end of what can now be viewed as a sort of "Long War" from 1914-1990, took everyone by surprise and left the world gasping, and unsighted as to what was likely to follow. At first, particularly after an act of aggression by Iraq against Kuwait was reversed by a coalition acting under the authority of the United Nations, some believed that what would emerge almost painlessly would be a new world order, with rules-based disciplines regulating disputes and finding responses to the threats and challenges which still existed. That was the vision of the first President Bush and many others. But it was not to be. Soon enough a rash of conflicts, more often within states than between them, and frequently following the failure of state institutions, proved beyond the capacity of the existing international institutions to control and resolve; terrible crimes of genocide and appalling breaches of international humanitarian law were committed; long running disputes - over Palestine, Kashmir and on the Korean Peninsula - continued to fester and to threaten to spin out of control; and a whole range of global challenges, from climate change to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, from poverty to pandemic diseases cried out for global solutions but did not receive them.

Most recently the whole world has been plunged into a financial and economic crisis, more serious than any we have faced, possibly since the 1930's and certainly since the 1970's. This latest crisis confronts us not only with many of the same threats to which we found such inadequate responses in the 1930's - threats from financial instability from trade protectionism, from unemployment, from potential political destabilisation - but also new ones resulting, for example, from a weakening resolve and a reduction in resources to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, to combat climate change, to prevent and resolve conflicts. No wonder, therefore, that some begin to feel that we are condemned to live through a period of new world disorder of indeterminate duration. No wonder too that siren voices are being heard arguing that these challenges are just too numerous for us to manage all at one time, that we need to turn in on ourselves and to put our own houses in order before confronting these global issues, that too much is being demanded in the way of sacrifice, whether it is in Afghanistan or in Africa. I will argue why I think we need to resist these siren voices and why we do not need to accept new world disorder as a given and how we can hope to overcome it or at least to reduce its symptoms.

The first thing to be said is that the situation in which we find ourselves is not as dramatically dire as we sometimes think and as screaming headlines, the horrific visual images on our television screens and the armchair pundits would lead us to believe. The coverage of events in Afghanistan by the British press is a case in point. To some extent we are the victims as well as the beneficiaries of the communications revolution which has transformed all our lives and which more or less coincided with the end of the Cold War. But serious academic studies demonstrate that far fewer people are dying world-wide in conflicts than was the case in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. It is not unreasonable to suppose that

this reduction in fatalities is at least partly due to the increase in conflict prevention activities and in international peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building efforts. Then hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of abject poverty during that long period of sustained economic growth and freer trade which preceded the present crisis. If we can ensure that that crisis is of reasonably short duration, there is no reason why that process should not resume, after all the economies of some of the largest developing countries like China, India and Brazil are continuing to grow at a respectable rate. We are getting to grips with a number of pandemic diseases, as the responses to SARS and to swine flu, not to mention the massive efforts going into combating AIDS, malaria and TB, are showing. And the culture of impunity for gross breaches of humanitarian law is under challenge as has never been the case before, with the operation of the Yugoslav, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. There are bound to be hard cases like that of President Bashir in Sudan, where tensions arise between the need for justice and the plight of refugees, but we must not turn back at the first manifestation of such tensions. So, while there are indeed grounds for deep concern about the present state of international developments, they should not cause us to despair or to weaken in our resolve to find adequate, collective responses designed to overcome the challenges we face.

Another reason not to despair is that the world seems to me to be at something of a watershed moment, at a time not entirely dissimilar to that at the end of the Cold War when the moulds in which international affairs have been set are cracking, when fundamental shifts in international relationships are taking place, when there are real opportunities to re-shape our policy responses to the main challenges and the multilateral institutions on which we have come to rely for so much of our global decision making. If we allow despair and apathy to dominate our responses, these changes will simply take place without us and very possibly to our detriment.

What are these fundamental shifts? There are many, but I would identify three. First, and most significant in the short term, the world has emerged from that US unilateral moment which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the US was quite simply the only super-power left standing. We shall never know how long that moment might have lasted if President George W Bush had acted more temperately and modestly and had treated US allies and its own international obligations with more respect. But he squandered that moment and he demonstrated that, while US hard power remains predominant, their ability to manage events by the sole strength of their right arm was insufficient. Now we have a quite different US President who is reaching out to both allies and adversaries and who is working for multilateral solutions to the world's problems. There is a real opportunity to work with the Obama administration and to help to shape joint responses to our shared problems. Then, secondly we are gradually emerging into a new multi-polar world. We are seeing the steady, and so far peaceful, rise of a number of major developing country powers, mainly, but not exclusively, in Asia - for example China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa. Contrary to much media speculation these powers are not about to dominate the world in the way the US did after the Cold War - either tomorrow or next year or even during the next decade. The process will take longer than that, and it could well be uneven. But it is under way, so we need to bring these countries fairly and squarely into the international debate and into international decision-making as we have not done hitherto. And, thirdly, we have an opportunity in Europe, as Britain no longer has as an individual country, to work collectively to help fashion those global responses. But to do that we will need to work more effectively with our European partners than has been the case in the past.

What then are the principal policy challenges and threats to which responses are needed in the period ahead?

First we have to face up with renewed determination and perseverance to all that remained undone in the climate change agenda when the Copenhagen Conference fell well short of what was hoped from it and of what was needed. We must not delude ourselves with talk of half full glasses. Complacency will only lead to underestimation of the distance that remains to travel if the Mexico conference in December of this year and others which are to follow it are to succeed where Copenhagen fell short. Continuing to fall short will expose us to risks the world is ill-equipped to handle. So we need to sustain the objective of a legally binding and technically credible international agreement to reduce carbon emissions in developed countries and to limit the rate of their growth in developing countries; we need to overcome the tensions between developed and developing countries by shaping up arrangements for technology transfer and by committing serious amounts of money to help developing countries adapt to low carbon economies and face up to the problems of climate change; we need to put in place properly international arrangements for monitoring and verifying the whole range of commitments which we have collectively entered into. And meanwhile we need to move ahead with implementing the commitments we have already made - in the EU for example to reduce our carbon emissions by at least 20% by 2020 and hopefully by the 30% which the EU has offered if others match it - and by funding the provisions for combating deforestation. How is all this to be achieved? Well not, as at Copenhagen, by waiting until the last moment and then hoping that a huge, unwieldy conference of 192 countries will be able to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. Nor by negotiating every word and sentence in such huge gatherings. We need, I would suggest, a more multi-faceted approach, with full use being made of the new G20 machinery - after all the G20 countries are responsible for over 80% of the world's carbon emissions. Such restricted groups, and there may be others, cannot and should not take legally binding decisions which must remain universal or as near to universal as can be achieved - because we must not let a few spoilers wreck the whole process - but they can shape up the building blocks out of which global agreements can subsequently be reached.

Then secondly we clearly have to work together on a global basis to ensure that all countries emerge as soon as possible from the present financial and economic crisis and that the systemic weaknesses which enabled it to occur are guarded against in the future. The four G20 summits that have so far been held have made steady progress in identifying what needs to be done. It will no doubt require many more months, and perhaps years, of determined negotiation to reach and to implement the necessary decisions. One area of crucial importance will be trade policy. The immediate imperative was to avoid that slide into protectionism which was such a disastrous feature of the world's response to similar events in the 1930's. So far in this crisis the damage done by protectionist responses has been relatively small, but not so small as to justify complacency. And we are far from being past the moment of maximum risk, since unemployment figures are and will continue to rise and to exercise pressure on governments for some considerable time after growth resumes. And we need to do more than just to resist protectionism. Throughout the post-Second World War period the growth in world trade led the growth in economies; and trade was stimulated and facilitated by successive rounds of trade liberalisation. So it is crucially important to return to the negotiating table of the Doha Round of trade negotiations as soon as is feasibly possible and to reach agreement on a package which provides for freer and fairer trade and which in particular takes better account of the needs of developing countries than has been the case in the past. And if, as is all too likely the US does not provide leadership in this effort, then the EU should do so.

No sector of international relations is currently more fraught with risk than that of nuclear proliferation, so the need to resume moves towards multilateral nuclear disarmament, so abruptly and damagingly checked by the policies of the George W Bush administration, must surely be a third major policy area which needs to be addressed. The agreement between the US and Russia to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons is only a first, albeit a welcome, step down that road, and even that remains to be ratified. Then the process needs to be broadened out to involve other nuclear weapons states - China, France and the UK. Negotiations should be

got under way on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The Comprehensive Test Ban treaty should be brought into force following US and other ratifications. Preparations for the 2012 discussions on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East should be undertaken without delay. More thought should be given to what are called negative security assurances by the nuclear weapons states to the non-nuclear states, and also to No First Use commitments. And internationally guaranteed arrangements should be firmed up to allow bona fide civil nuclear users access to uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities without the need to construct such facilities for themselves with all the proliferation risks that that involves. If an ambitious negotiating programme such as this can be got under way, then the relative success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference last May will not be frittered away as so often has been the case in the past. All this leaves the hard cases of North Korea and Iran, which are getting harder to handle as the days go by. We should have no illusions. There will not be a soft landing if those two countries achieve a deliverable nuclear weapons capability. At the very least there are likely to be destabilising regional nuclear arms races as others respond to these developments. There could be worse. So a renewed diplomatic effort to head off these two countries' nuclear ambitions, one which will have to take into account their genuine security concerns, is urgently required. And that effort will have to contain a judicious blend of sticks and carrots if it is to have any chance of succeeding.

The mere mention of the Middle East Peace Process tends to provoke cynicism and a weary shrug, and even the recent move back into direct negotiations between the parties has not lifted the mood of pessimism. But events of the last few years in South Lebanon and Gaza should surely have reminded us how combustible that region is. For the first time a US President has thrown his weight behind that peace process at the outset of his term in office and not towards the end of his second one. Europe has an important role to play in any such process, not just, as it has done in the past and is still doing, by underpinning the finances of the Palestinian Authority, but also by playing an active role in any security arrangements which

are part of a settlement and by strengthening its relationship with a post-settlement Israel. Any peace process will have to be inclusive, which will mean talking to, and eventually negotiating with, Hamas. Meanwhile a national unity government in the Palestinian territories, committed to the Arab Peace Initiative, would seem to be the best way into a resumed negotiation, and both the Europeans and the US need to give their full support to such an initiative.

Then fifthly, amongst the priority policy areas I would identify is conflict prevention and peacekeeping, in greater demand than ever and suffering numerous symptoms of overstretch and criticism, particularly in countries like ours which have borne the brunt of involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whatever the rights and wrongs of those two cases those functions of conflict prevention and peacekeeping are at the heart of the UN's mandate and must not be allowed to atrophy if collective security, of which they are an important part, although not the whole, is not to suffer. Regional and sub-regional security arrangements could usefully be built up in parts of the world where they do not already exist - for example in the Gulf, in South Asia and in North East Asia - and where they do, and are beginning to perform effectively as conflict preventers and peacekeepers - the African Union is a case in point - should be strengthened by the UN - with support in training, in logistics and in finance. In particular when the UN asks the African Union to take on a peacekeeping mission the UN should be prepared to finance it on assessed contributions. Nor should the UN neglect the need to find ways to operationalise the concept of the "Responsibility to Protect", that potentially revolutionary break-through at the 2005 UN Summit which so far has remained little more than words on paper. It is essential that this concept should cease to be regarded as simply a recipe for military intervention. Instead it needs to be fashioned into a complete toolbox of diplomatic and economic instruments designed to prevent state failure, so often the precursor to massive abuses of international humanitarian law, to ethnic cleansing and to genocide. The UN Secretary-General's recent report on how to develop and to operationalise Responsibility to Protect points the way ahead; the challenge now is for the member states to follow it.

So far I have focussed on areas of policy which will need to constitute the essential building blocks for a world seeking to avoid disorder. Far too often at the UN and elsewhere recourse is made to solely institutional fixes to achieve that objective. A purely institutional approach will never work if there is not also some broad consensus over policies. But agreed policies do need a greatly strengthened and reformed institutional framework if they are to be effectively negotiated and implemented. So here are five suggested institutional reforms to match the five areas of policy to which I have drawn attention:

First, at the IMF and World Bank, the path identified by last year's G20 Summit in London needs to be vigorously followed up. No more pre-emption of the top jobs by Europe and the US. A bigger say in decisions for the large developing countries. New systems to warn of and to guard against systemic weaknesses in the financial system. Stronger regulatory safeguards. More resources to help developing countries in particular to weather economic crises;

Second, the decision having now been taken, belatedly in my view, to establish the G20 as the principal instrument for global economic coordination, it is crucial to make the preparation of its meetings systematic and structured, so that the G20 summits do not just become a series of photo-opportunities with waning credibility. A delicate balance will need to be achieved if the G20 is to give the much-needed momentum to such global negotiations as those on trade and climate change without damaging the continuing need for wider buy-in if those negotiations are to reach legally binding conclusions;

Third, the UN Security Council should be enlarged with, as a first stage but not the final word, the creation of a new category of longer term, renewable but not permanent members. This formula which was proposed by the High Level Panel and by Kofi Annan in

2004 is the only one which has any chance of achieving a broad consensus in the near future;

Fourth, the establishment of a new UN agency to oversee implementation of any climate change package which can be agreed with energy issues, hitherto neglected in the UN system, included within its remit;

Fifth, there should be an end to the system by which rotation between regions of the post of UN Secretary-General is achieved by the pre-emptive restriction of candidates at the outset of the appointment process to those from only one region, as has been the case in all elections since 1991.

This institutional side of the international agenda should not be pursued as a single, comprehensive process. That is not likely to work and it is liable to give rise to reform fatigue such as followed the 2005 UN Summit. Far better to pursue institutional changes on a sectoral basis, moving forward when there is a broad degree of support for change.

I have attempted to sketch out an answer to the question posed in the title of my talk, that is to say to show that there is an alternative to new world disorder. I would not however advocate some grandiose title for it such as new world order. That is as likely to breed resistance, rejection and ridicule as it is to muster support. What is advocated here is the building up of islands of rules-based arrangements amongst the swirling mists of disorder which I fear we will not, for a long time, if ever, wholly dissipate. That seems to me an ambitious but achievable objective and one to which we should urge our new coalition government to devote itself.