Regional Security Organisations and the Challenge of Regional Peacekeeping

Introduction

In the post-Cold War period, regional security organisations have acquired a substantive role in leading international efforts in peace and security. While Chapter VIII of the UN Charter clearly encourages regional participation in security activities, the emergence of regional organisations as important actors demands a consideration of their diversity and capacity, the problems associated with regional security action, and above all the forms of regional-UN co-operation.

Regionalisation

The regionalisation of security issues - and peacekeeping operations in particular - has developed in part as a pragmatic response to the UN's peacekeeping experiences in the last decade.

Increased Security Council accord in the early 1990s inspired the rapid increase in UN peacekeeping activities. At its peak, the deployment of almost 80,000 peacekeepers in over thirty multidimensional operations seriously over-stretched the UN's resources. This led former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to comment in An Agenda for Peace (1992) that regional action could lighten the burden on the UN.

In the late 1990s, a comprehensive review of how the UN conducts peace operations - culminating in the release of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) in August 2000 - invited the (re)imposition of limits on when and where the UN is prepared to operate, as well as the kind of missions it is willing to undertake. The Brahimi Report recognised that the UN is ill-equipped to deal with the demands of peace enforcement, and that such muscular peacekeeping responsibilities should be deferred to coalitions of willing states and regional organisations.

Regional Co-operation with the UN

At the time of the creation of the UN system, a vigorous debate surrounded the rival concepts of regionalism and globalism. While some States favoured a regional security apparatus whereby local powers could take responsibility for security affairs in their areas, other (smaller) States feared this could give rise to the regional dominance of powerful States and were consequently concerned with preserving their identity.

The gap between these concepts has perhaps been exaggerated, as the UN Charter - a globalist document - provides for a close working relationship between the UN and regional organisations. Chapter VIII states that the Security Council shall encourage the settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements (Article 52 (3)) and shall utilise them for enforcement action under its authority (Article 53 (1)).

In his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995), Boutros Boutros-Ghali cites several forms of co-operation, including consultation, diplomatic and operational support, co-deployment, and joint missions. Regional co-operation with the UN combines the major advantages of the UN - its global legitimacy and ability to mobilise greater resources - with those of regional organisations. They are highly motivated and committed to resolving disputes which affect their own Member States, they often posses greater local knowledge and understanding of the dynamics of a conflict, and they might be better positioned to offer 'carrots' and 'sticks' to co-opt States into compliance with their demands.

The mission in Haiti provides a useful example. After a military coup d'état had overthrown Haiti's democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide - generating political violence and human rights violations - Special Envoy Dante Caputo was appointed to represent both the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the UN in an effort to facilitate a peaceful solution to the crisis. The subsequent Governors' Island Agreement of July 1993 called for the establishment of the joint UN-OAS International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH). While the UN contributed most of the operational support, mechanisms for consultation were established to facilitate UN-OAS co-ordination, including joint working groups. In addition in 1995, the OAS assumed responsibility for monitoring the national elections while the UN provided technical assistance.

Such co-deployment requires an effective division of labour to avoid duplication and utilise the comparative advantages of each actor involved. In Kosovo, where an international effort has been underway since 1999 attempting to transform the territory into a functioning democratic society, four regional organisations operate under the direction of the UN civil administration mission (UNMIK). While NATO is responsible for overall security, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) leads humanitarian assistance, the OSCE directs democratisation and institution-building, and the EU heads economic reconstruction.

Regional Diversity

Notwithstanding the positive aspects of regional-UN co-operation, Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette has highlighted that the nature of the relationship is problematic owing in particular to the diversity of regional organisations.

Regional organisations can range from those that encompass (almost) all States in a defined region - such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU) - to those like the Francophonie and the Commonwealth, which are groupings of States with something other than geography in common.

Regional peacekeeping capacity is the most acute area of diversity, a point raised in the Brahimi Report:

Military resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has some of the most relevant peacekeeping experience of any regional organisation from its role in Liberia. Even so, troops from some of its Member States lack necessary training and equipment, hampering its peacekeeping ability. Similarly, although the OAS focuses on the defence, promotion and consolidation of democracy - critical aspects of peacekeeping - it has no mandate for the use of force and lacks a 'peacekeeping' capability as it is understood in the UN context. Political factors also contribute to the diversity in regional peacekeeping capacity. For instance, a commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states by ASEAN and the AU has hampered the development of their crisis management and peacekeeping capabilities.

European Security Organisations

In contrast, Europe has an abundance of experienced security organisations and so offers the potential for 'forum-shopping' - whereby the most suitable institution can attempt to resolve a conflict.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): NATO is Europe's leading security organisation, owing to the substantial unity among its Members, its wealth of resources, and its concentration on 'hard-security' issues in the military sphere. Originally conceived as a Cold War defence alliance, throughout the 1990s NATO demonstrated its ability to adapt and undertake complex missions, such as in Bosnia where the Dayton Peace Accords afforded NATO the predominant security role under UN direction. More significant however was Operation Allied Force (1999) in Kosovo, where NATO highlighted its unrivalled military capabilities as well as a belief in its own legitimacy to carry out such operations.

The European Union (EU): The EU has actively been developing its crisis management capacity in the last decade. While the concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) enjoys only mixed support from Member States at present, in June 2003 an EU force was deployed to the Congo - under Chapter VII of the UN Charter - until a long-term UN peacekeeping force could replace it. This was the EU's most ambitious operation to date, and the first outside the European continent. In addition, the EU has taken significant steps to boost its military capabilities to conduct peace operations through the development of a rapid-reaction force. This force could provide assistance to UN-led missions or be used for EU missions. Although it was announced in May 2003 that the number of available troops had reached the target of 60,000, a lack of political support and budgetary commitments limits the project from reaching its full potential.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Rarely discussed by the media, relegated to Europe's 'third' security organisation, and often dismissed as a forum for diplomatic haggling, the OSCE is the most inclusive 'European' institution, encompassing all states in Europe, Central Asia and the Former Soviet Union, as well as the USA, Canada and Russia. It promotes a comprehensive concept of security that includes humanitarian, economic and environmental dimensions, as well as military aspects. Its commitment to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the market economy, and arms control, represent the foundation of a stable and secure Europe, and it upholds a flexible and pragmatic approach to co-operation based on consensus and equal participation.

Further, the OSCE makes an invaluable contribution to European security in at least three respects. First, the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) plays a pivotal role in conflict prevention, mandated to provide early warning of tensions involving national minority issues with the potential to develop into conflict within the OSCE area. After a visit to Ukraine in 1994 by HCNM Max van der Stoel, the OSCE acted on his recommendations to send a group of experts on constitutional and economic matters to facilitate a dialogue with Crimean authorities. Rolf Ekeus, van der Stoel's successor, also initiated fact-finding missions and 'shuttle diplomacy' that proved instrumental in moderating nationalist stances in a number of Baltic States.

Second, OSCE field missions demonstrate its crisis management capacity. Most of the OSCE budget (US$156m in 2001) supports eighteen missions across the Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and South-eastern Europe. In Chechnya, where the head of the OSCE mission has offered to mediate a negotiated settlement between Russia and the Chechen separatists, the OSCE is the only international presence in the region, guaranteeing it a high level of influence.

Finally, the OSCE is well placed to tackle contemporary threats like terrorism, organised crime, political repression and the denial of human rights. These challenges cannot be solved by military action alone, but rather require long-term 'soft-security' initiatives fundamental to the work of the OSCE.

Problems Encountered by Regional Organisations

While diverse in their capacities, regional organisations are subject to certain common problems - some similar to those experienced by the UN - that render the prospect of effective regional peacekeeping less attainable.

(1) Operational Aspects

A lack of financial resources represents a significant obstacle to the deployment of regional operations, and without international financial support their effectiveness and credibility is significantly undermined. Political divisions are also rife in regional organisations and can hinder the effectiveness of regional initiatives. For example, the absence of agreement between the USA and Russia concerning the precise role of the OSCE appears to undermine its raison d'être of bridging the East-West divide as well as its ability make decisions. Similarly, divisions in ECOWAS serve to perpetuate Anglophone and Francophone rivalries.

(2) Political Partiality

The UN usually deploys troops from Member States with no direct stake in a conflict, and is thus able to maintain its impartiality. By contrast, the willingness and interest of regional organisations to resolve crises in their areas can give rise to criticisms of political 'side-taking'. This problem surfaced in Liberia, where Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso appeared to take different sides in the conflict. The South African Development Community's (SADC) efforts to resolve the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were also tarnished by the internal political clash between South Africa and Zimbabwe, as well as their opposing external support for various factions.

(3) Legality and Legitimacy

Regional organisations also face the problem of legitimacy when they act without specific authorisation of the Security Council. In Liberia, ECOMOG claimed that the refugee crisis and human rights violations constituted a threat to peace and security and warranted intervention. Similarly in Kosovo, NATO judged that the unfolding humanitarian crisis fuelled by Serb violations of human rights, coupled with the seemingly impossible prospect of a Security Council resolution, justified intervention. While both missions received implicit and retroactive authorisation from the UN - Resolution 1244 of June 1999 approved the peace settlement in Kosovo, authorised the deployment of NATO troops and effectively ratified NATO action - initially they were criticised on the grounds of acting illegally and without legitimacy.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan has acknowledged that the evolution of international human rights standards undermines the norms of non-intervention in the face of severe human rights abuses. However, the controversy that surrounds the concept of humanitarian intervention suggests that regional organisations should always seek to gain Security Council authorisation, particularly where peace enforcement is involved.

(4) Regional Hegemony

Regional security organisations are often dominated by a State with greater political, economic, military and demographic capabilities than its neighbours and partners, known as regional hegemons. Nigeria falls into this category in West Africa, owing to its wealth of natural resources, high level of defence spending, vast population, and international status.

The precise role of hegemons is problematic. They are relied upon to undertake leadership roles in regional peacekeeping and post-war reconstruction efforts, as well as to provide the necessary resources. For instance, without Nigerian involvement, the ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) mission in Liberia in 1990 could not have been mounted. Indeed, Nigeria provided nearly 70% of the resources for the mission that would otherwise have suffered from a lack of necessary equipment, finance, and troops experienced in peacekeeping.

Nevertheless, regional hegemons can represent significant obstacles to effective regional action. Not least, they can manipulate regional organisations to serve their own interests: ASEAN's failure to pressure Indonesia during the East Timor crisis illustrates the point. Hegemons can also keep security issues off the regional or global agenda, as Russia has done in respect of Chechnya, and the USA regarding the drug problem in Colombia. The presence of dominant States in a region can block regional development, and accordingly regions such as North, Central and South Asia - overshadowed by India and China - lack regional alternatives to the UN. Finally, hegemons can come under pressure from other States in an organisation if they are seen as partial or heavy-handed. In Liberia, Nigeria's leadership role was frequently challenged, impeding regional co-operation.

Final Remarks

In the light of this discussion of the emergence and role of regional organisations, it must be remembered that the UN has the experience and capacity to respond most effectively to complex crises. While regional organisations enjoy certain advantages, it seems that, as Louise Fréchette has suggested, there is a danger of over-reliance on regional organisations to carry out tasks that an adequately mandated and equipped UN peacekeeping force could carry out better.

Author: Tim Pippard, Research Assistant, editor: Alex Ramsbotham, Head of Research.

This set of briefing papers has been financed by a donation in memory of Joy K B Wynn-Jones and Mary Owen. For a full publication list and more detailed information on the work of the Programme, please contact Alexander Ramsbotham, Head of Research, UN and Conflict Programme, UNA-UK, 3 Whitehall Court, London SW1A 2EL.

Tel: (switchboard) +44 (0)20 7766 3444 (direct line) +44 (0)20 7766 3446 Fax: +44 (0)20 7930 5893 E-mail: aramsbotham@una-uk.org.