Briefing (revised 17 February 2004)

Peacemaking

Introduction

The UN describes peacemaking as 'the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in a conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement to their dispute'. These means are outlined in Article 33(1) of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, which states that:

The parties to a dispute shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.

It follows that the two critical features of peacemaking are the consent of the parties to outside assistance and the exclusion of the use of force.

Key Characteristics

In this context, peacemaking has developed certain key characteristics.

(1) Political Initiatives

Although peacemaking can include formal legal measures - including judicial settlements at the International Court of Justice - it is more generally carried out through political initiatives. The 'high-risk' nature of legal strategies, often entailing a 'zero-sum' outcome, means that negotiation and mediation afford a comparatively 'low-risk' opportunity for disputants to seek mutually acceptable outcomes, boosting the chances of success.

(2) Multi-Track Approach

Peacemaking involves more than traditional diplomacy. Negotiations concerning highly charged issues often involve 'multi-track' diplomacy - pursued beyond solely official channels - and are carried out in an informal manner. Negotiations leading to the Oslo Peace Accords over the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1993 provide a good example of this technique. Conducted in the remote mountains of Norway, representatives from the Israeli administration and the Palestinian Authority were able gradually to grind out an agreement, away from the media.

(3) Ripeness

Peacemaking requires a sense of 'ripeness' for outside assistance. While ideally this occurs before the outbreak of violence, it often involves an exhaustion of the military option by the disputing parties. Successful peacemakers can help induce this 'ripeness' through 'carrot and stick diplomacy': that is, by bargaining with the parties, pressuring them to accept specific terms, and providing guarantees in return for compliance. Such pressure is often difficult to foster at the UN because it lacks readily available economic and military resources, and its collective style of discussion can dilute its demands.

(4) No UN Monopoly

The UN does not claim monopoly in the peacemaking field. Rather, disputing parties can turn to a range of actors for assistance and there is no set strategy. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has had a crucial influence in resolving disputes in the former Soviet-bloc, and the Organisation for American States (OAS) played a critical peacemaking role in Nicaragua and Haiti. Ad hoc bodies like the Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia are important sources of inducement through their physical and/or political proximity. Non-governmental organisations can mediate in more adaptable ways than government representatives. And private actors assign 'high-profile' character to negotiations: a trip by former US president Jimmy Carter helped initiate the peace agreement in Haiti in 1994.

The UN Machinery

However, the UN - through its impartiality and global representation - remains the principal forum for diplomatic efforts to resolve international disputes. The peacemaking functions of the UN relate to the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly and Security Council

The General Assembly can discuss and make recommendations to the parties on any matter relating to international peace and security (Article 11) unless the Security Council is discussing the matter (Article 12). Likewise, the Council can decide to consider any matter brought to its attention by the General Assembly, Secretary-General, and individual Member States. Once on its agenda, Chapter VI of the UN Charter allows the Council to call upon the parties to settle their dispute by peaceful means (Article 33 (2)) and recommend appropriate procedures for this process (Article 36).

The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Secretary-General

The DPA is the body with the primary responsibility for peacemaking within the UN Secretariat. Headed by an Under-Secretary-General (currently Kieran Prendergast), the DPA monitors, analyses and assesses global political developments, identifies potential and actual conflicts and, through the Policy Planning Unit, aims to develop the Department's peacemaking capacity. Above all, the DPA provides advice and support for the Secretary-General in the exercise of his responsibilities. This includes managing fact-finding missions and diplomatic activities, and recommending appropriate causes of action.

The authority of the Secretary-General to engage in peacemaking activities emanates from three sources. First, parties to a dispute can directly invite his involvement. Second, the Security Council can instruct him to perform such functions, in accordance with Article 98. Third, and most crucially, the UN Charter makes specific reference in Article 99 to the power of the Secretary-General to 'bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his opinion may threaten international peace and security'[emphasis added]. The Secretary-General's office thus enjoys an independent role, and wide scope to influence what constitutes a threat to the peace. As such, his personality can have a significant bearing on the UN's involvement in peacemaking.

For instance in 1946, when the Council was considering sending a commission to investigate infiltration across Greece's northern border, Secretary-General Trygve Lie declared 'I hope the Council will understand that the Secretary-General must reserve his rights to make such inquiries or investigations as he may think necessary'. Subsequent Secretaries-General have interpreted their powers in an equally broad manner. Dag Hammarskjöld initiated a number of diplomatic missions including a decision on his own authority to enlarge the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958. More broadly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought to maximise the leverage of his office by using his reports to the Council - including An Agenda for Peace - as tools to influence its debates and decisions.

Peacemaking in Practice

Both the Security Council and General Assembly have acted independently by making recommendations to disputing parties. In 1976, the Council called upon Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their differences with regard to the Aegean Sea. Likewise in 1948, the General Assembly recommended an elaborate plan for the future of Palestine. Both these organs have also made extensive use of fact-finding missions, sent into problem countries at critical moments in an effort to stem the tension.

Still, it is the Secretary-General - be it on his own authority or authorised by the Council - who usually takes the lead in the UN's peacemaking capacity. This relates to his ability to engage in 'quiet diplomacy' in contrast to the public and politically driven arena of the Council and General Assembly.

Good Offices

The provision of informal and low-key channels of communication - known as 'good offices' - has become central to the Secretary-General's peacemaking efforts. This function provides security to the disputing parties, helps foster momentum, and builds confidence in the negotiating process.

As the longest running good offices effort by the UN, Cyprus demonstrates well both the limits and potential of this function. Inter-communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led the Security Council in Resolution 186 (1964) to authorise the establishment of a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) and to facilitate the setting up of good offices. As a sign of the success of good offices, two agreements were signed in 1977 and 1979, respectively, spelling out at a framework for co-operation. However, little subsequent progress was achieved. Thus in November 2002, Kofi Annan, in an attempt to further the stalled process, presented a comprehensive peace plan that proposed a federation with two constituent parts, presided over by a rotating presidency. Nevertheless, the March 2003 deadline for agreement passed without signature, leaving Annan to acknowledge the plan a failure. Thus, while good offices efforts alone proved unsuccessful in achieving a lasting solution, this function has at least diminished the level of violence and established an element of trust to the process.

Elsewhere, good offices have been used to secure commitment to the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements of 1947, to monitor the cease-fire between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965, and to mediate the Falklands crisis between Argentina and the UK in 1982. More recently, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has used his good offices to help promote the transition to civilian rule in Nigeria in 1998, and to forge an international response to the violence in East Timor in 1999.

Mediation and Negotiation

The Secretary-General's office has also enjoyed much success in the role of impartial mediation and negotiation. A Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) is often assigned a long-term role in peace processes, as was the case in El Salvador. In 1989, representatives of both the Salvadoran Government and the rebel faction FMLN contacted UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar seeking his involvement in facilitating a settlement to the twelve-year civil war. In response, Alvaro de Soto was assigned SRSG to steer the negotiations. These lasted two years and succeeded in putting an end to the violence and achieving a lasting settlement signed in Mexico City in January 1992. Similarly, the Secretary-General can work in collaboration with regional groups and can even establish ad hoc bodies. For example, the 'Friends of the Secretary-General' played a crucial role in the early 1990s in Haiti and El Salvador as a means of political inducement and burden sharing.

One of the most successful UN peacemaking efforts to date concerned the talks on Afghanistan convened in Bonn, Germany, in November-December 2001. Spearheaded by the UN SRSG to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN successfully fostered international involvement and consensus in a highly time-pressured situation. Nine days of intensive negotiations demonstrated the ability of UN negotiators to induce a sense of ripeness to the process and apply pressure to the parties by threatening to withhold billions of dollars of aid promised by the international community to rebuild Afghanistan, unless an acceptable agreement was reached.

Under this pressure, the process culminated in the signing of a declaration by the four Afghan parties who attended the talks, committing them to a broad-based and multiethnic government after a two-year UN-assisted interim administration. The success of the process led the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to comment: 'I think in an impressive way the United Nations has demonstrated again that they are able to take a leadership role in situations such as these'.

The Limits of Peacemaking

UN peacemaking efforts are subject to certain limitations, stemming both from within and outside the Organisation.

Internal Limitations

The ability of the Secretary-General to mediate crises effectively is conditioned firstly by the interplay between his office, the Security Council, and the General Assembly. The Secretary-General is constrained and influenced by the views of the political organs, which have the ability to diminish the credibility of good offices through their statements and resolutions. Also, it is risky for the Secretary-General to get involved in situations simply because the political organs are unwilling to act. As former Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar states, 'the temptation to aggrandisement can discredit the institution of Secretary-General because it can lead the Secretary-General into courses of action that are not realistically sustainable'.

Also, a lack of finance often stands as a significant restriction on the peacemaking capacity of the UN. As an effort to curb the tide of violence, peacemaking is successful when enforcement action is not required, and often passes unnoticed. Thus, although peacemaking is much cheaper than enforcement, funding is not always forthcoming because the costs and benefits are less apparent to contributing states.

External Limitations

While internal difficulties at the UN are important, the extent to which peacemaking can resolve disputes is governed above all by the consent, desire, and political willingness of the disputing parties to co-operate for peace. The UN can only help facilitate this process.

The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict is a case in point. Resolution 242 (22 November 1967) called upon Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and requested the Secretary-General to send a Special Representative to assist in efforts to mediate a peaceful solution to the problem. Moreover, Resolution 338 of October 1973 proposed an immediate cease-fire, called upon all parties to implement immediately Resolution 242, and decided that all parties start negotiations under appropriate auspices for a durable peace. However, the UN has been unable to break the stalemate. The hard-line approach of the Israeli administrations of Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon, matched by problems relating to the political structure of the Palestinian Authority, have impeded real progress on issues outlined at Oslo in 1993, including a border settlement and the status of Jerusalem. Despite continued US efforts to push forward the negotiations - through the Camp David Summit in July 2000 and more recently by unveiling the 'Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict' in April 2003 - the inability of both sides to commit to peace has thus far doomed the process.

These US initiatives demonstrate that peacemaking efforts outside of UN direction also suffer from limitations. Here, the Northern Ireland dispute is telling. In reiterating a proposal for a cross-border administration that three years previously had proved unacceptable to Unionists, the UK-steered Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, despite at the time fostering a sense of ripeness, failed to provide an adequate blueprint for sustainable peace. As such, none of the parties have wholeheartedly supported its implementation, and instead have consistently threatened to withdraw from the process. Nonetheless, as a mark of the success of mediation in 1998, the Good Friday Agreement remains the benchmark of a process that has certainly paved the way for ongoing dialogue in Northern Ireland.

Final Remarks

In the light of this discussion, it must be concluded that peacemaking will not always prove successful in resolving disputes. While the UN is well-placed to mediate and engage in informal diplomacy, peaceful dispute settlement cannot be imposed upon parties. The UN Charter reflects this reality by outlining provisions for peace enforcement activities in Chapter VII, and it seems that peacemaking is most likely to be effective when undertaken in conjunction with UN preventive action, peacekeeping, and peace-building operations.

Author: Tim Pippard, Research Assistant, Editor: Alex Ramsbotham, Head of Research.

This set of briefing papers has been financed by a donation in memory of Joy K B Wynn-Jones and Mary Owen. For a full publication list and more detailed information on the work of the Programme, please contact Alexander Ramsbotham, Head of Research, UN and Conflict Programme, UNA-UK, 3 Whitehall Court, London SW1A 2EL.

Tel: (switchboard) +44 (0)20 7766 3444 (direct line) +44 (0)20 7766 3446 Fax: +44 (0)20 7930 5893 E-mail: aramsbotham@una-uk.org.